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Abstract 
The impetus behind the introduction of the statutory provision was the perceived need to protect the 
vulnerable minority shareholder against the unfair manipulation of the majority rule. Its raison d’être is 
clearly personal. And, as it is an important tool in the minority shareholder's arsenal, it is necessary that 
the scope of its application be sufficiently wide. The provision is therefore couched in expansive terms. 
This has led to questions being raised as to the scope of its application. Specifically, can a shareholder 
attempt to vindicate corporate claims through the provision? This short paper considers this issue against 
the background provided by the recent Singapore Court of Appeal decision of Ng Kek Wee v Sim City 
Technology Ltd. 
 
 
A. Introduction 
The statutory oppression action is undoubtedly one of the most important measures implemented for the 
protection of the minority shareholder in the common law world. It first appeared as section 210 of the 
English Companies Act 1948. This legislative prototype, with all its limitations,1 provided the inspiration 
for similar provisions to be adopted, in varying permutations, in other common law jurisdictions.2 Whilst 
the statutory oppression action is indubitably personal3 in nature, the breadth of the remedial jurisdiction 
conferred has given pause to the question whether the utility of the section might extend beyond the 
personal remit to permit the vindication of corporate claims. This question has been raised in other 
jurisdictions,4 but was most recently ventilated before the Singapore Court of Appeal in Ng Kek Wee v 
Sim City Technology Ltd.5  
B. The Facts and the Decision 
Sim City, which controlled almost 54% of the shares in the subject company, had applied for an order, 
under section 216 of the Companies Act,6 complaining of commercial unfairness in how Ng, the 
managing director of the company, had been conducting the company's affairs. The company was 
essentially a holding company and its business was entirely conducted through a number of wholly owned 
subsidiaries. The High Court had found for Sim City, on the basis of certain unauthorised transfers that 
Ng had made to himself of the company's interests in its subsidiaries. The court also took account of the 
fact that Ng, whilst acting as a director of the subsidiaries, had misappropriated the funds of those 
subsidiaries. 
Ng did not appeal against the court's findings of wrongdoing on his part, but challenged the judge's 
conclusion that oppression had been established. He contended first that the judge had erred in taking 
account of Ng's misconduct in connection with the subject company's subsidiaries, since any unfair 
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conduct must relate, by the express terms of section 216,7 only to the ‘affairs of the (subject) company 
[emphasis added]’. The Court of Appeal considered this contention to be ‘off the mark’.8 Indeed, the 
relevance of the manner in which the affairs of the subject company's subsidiaries was conducted with 
respect to the issue of section 216 relief had been expressly acknowledged in the earlier Court of Appeal 
decision of Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon Pte Ltd.9 Where, as here, the subject company had been 
incorporated purely as a holding company, the business of the holding company was, in effect, the 
respective businesses of its subsidiaries.10 In such situations, the manner in which the affairs of the 
subsidiaries are conducted is clearly of significance to the holding company.11 To deny the relevance of 
the same would be ‘overly narrow and legalistic’.12 Nevertheless, the court recognised that the Saloman 
principle and the text of the section had to be accorded due respect.13 In the court's view, therefore, an 
appropriate balance would be achieved by ‘a requirement that commercially unfair conduct in the 
management of a subsidiary would be relevant so long and to the extent that such conduct affected or 
impacted the holding company whose member was the party claiming relief’.14  
Ng's further contention was that Sim City ought to have been disentitled from relief under section 216 as 
it controlled a majority of the votes in the company. It was on this contention that the appeal in fact 
turned. Although the oppression remedy is often referred to as a minority shareholder remedy, there is in 
fact nothing in section 216 that precludes a majority shareholder from seeking redress thereunder.15 Such 
types of applicant, however, tend to be somewhat uncommon. This is because the very premise of an 
oppression action is an inequality of power and an unfair or inequitable exercise of the dominant power.16 
Clearly, a majority shareholder is more likely to be in a position of power dominance. The Court of 
Appeal noted that ‘the touchstone is not whether the claimant is a minority shareholder of the company in 
question, but whether he lacks the power to stop the allegedly oppressive acts’.17 Given Sim City's 
majority stake, and there being nothing in the company's articles to constrain the exercise of its votes, it 
was clearly within Sim City's powers to remove Ng from the boards of the affected companies, hence 
removing the source of the alleged oppression. In the circumstances, the court held that there could not 
have been unfairness under section 216.18  
The Court of Appeal is not, of course, saying that a majority shareholder is, by virtue of his majority stake 
alone, precluded from bringing a section 216 application. A majority shareholder might well find himself 
in a vulnerable position, for example, if he or she had surrendered some aspect of his rights of control by 
agreement with the other shareholders, or where he or she had agreed to a grant of specific veto powers to 
the minority.19 In such cases, as Woo Bi Lih JC noted in Tong Keng Meng v Inno-Pacific Holdings Ltd,20  
C. The Oppression Action and Corporate Wrongs 
Ng's further, and arguably more theoretically significant,22 contention was that as the wrongs that 
underpinned Sim City's claim were corporate wrongs, so it ought not to have been permitted to make the 
application under section 216. The statutory remedy for oppression was, of course, not intended to 
address wrongs to the company. The avowed reason given when it was first introduced was to ‘strengthen 
the minority shareholders of a private company in resisting oppression by the majority’.23 It was and is, 
therefore, first and foremost, a personal remedy. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the proper plaintiff rule, it 
is generally accepted that relief may be obtained pursuant to the oppression action even where the matters 
complained of are, strictly speaking, wrongs to the company. This is a necessary concession, as it is often 
through the medium of such wrongs that oppression is inflicted upon the hapless minority shareholders.24 
The fact that the derivative route is also available is no bar to the shareholder's personal access to the 
oppression remedy. As Lord Wilberforce stated pointedly in Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd,25 ‘if a 
case of “oppression” or “disregard” is made out, the section applies and it is no answer to say that relief 
might also have been obtained in a minority shareholders’ action’.26  
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The question whether these corporate wrongs may themselves be vindicated via the statutory oppression 
action is, however, quite a different matter. The Court of Appeal affirmed that this should not be 
permitted under section 216. The court gave two inter-related reasons to support its view. First, an 
expansive reading of section 216 to accommodate this would run counter to the legislative scheme for 
shareholder action under the Companies Act.27 The Act has provided, since 1993, a statutory procedure in 
section 216A by which a shareholder may apply to the court for leave to bring proceedings on the 
company's behalf.28 The juxtaposition of the sections together with the specific amendment to include the 
descriptor ‘personal remedies’ to the marginal note to section 216 was ‘indicative of the legislative 
intention to clarify the distinction between the action for personal relief under s 216 … and the action for 
corporate relief under s 216A’.29 Further, the shareholder is required, under section 216A, to satisfy the 
court as to specified standing and substantial preconditions30 First, the complainant must have given 14 
days' notice to the directors of the company of his intention to apply to the court if the directors of the 
company do not bring, diligently prosecute, defend or discontinue the action. Secondly, the complainant 
must be acting in good faith. Thirdly, it must appear to be prima facie in the interests of the company that 
the action be brought, prosecuted, defended or discontinued: Companies Act 2006 (S'pore), s 
216A(3).View all notes before the court will grant leave for the bringing of a derivative action. As the 
court noted:  
These requirements are important built-in safeguards that ensure that any litigation brought by a 
shareholder to pursue corporate claims is guided by the legitimate interests of the company and would 
result in an increase in the corporate value … Parliament could not have intended for shareholders to 
sidestep these requirements by characterising a claim for corporate relief as a personal claim.31  
Secondly, permitting corporate actions to be pursued via section 216 would sanction an improper 
circumvention of the rule in Foss v Harbottle.32 This echoes the view expressed by Lord Scott of 
Foscote33 in connection with Hong Kong's statutory oppression action34 in Re Chime Corp Ltd.35 At the 
time of the decision, Hong Kong had yet to introduce the statutory derivative action, and the shareholder's 
right to bring derivative proceedings was then governed solely by the common law. As is well known, the 
common law route is rather strictly circumscribed by the rule in Foss v Harbottle.36 Allowing the 
oppression action to embrace corporate wrongs will undoubtedly go some way towards alleviating the 
minority shareholder's plight.37 There is, in fact, some judicial sympathy for this view.38 Nevertheless, the 
sound policy reasons that sustained, and continue to sustain, the rule in Foss v Harbottle militate against 
such a move. The proper plaintiff principle, a necessary corollary of the separate legal personality, is, as 
the Court of Appeal noted, ‘far from … a legalistic procedural obstacle’.39 As Choo Han Teck J had 
earlier observed in Ting Sing Ning v Ting Chek Swee:40  
The rule is a useful one because it avoids the multiplicity of actions by individual members by giving the 
right of action to the company itself; and thus, and in many instances, prevents a minority from 
oppressing the majority by inflicting vexatious and unwarranted legal action. 
To allow an individual shareholder to take charge of corporate litigation is to vest in him the 
‘extraordinary power’41 to subject the company, and to commit its resources, to ‘a position of legal 
conflict’42 even when a majority of the company, acting through the board of directors or some other 
corporate process dictated by the company's constitutional documents, is not supportive of the action. 
This clearly offends the principle of majority rule, which is the basic premise of corporate operations 
generally. In light of this, the threshold requirements for a derivative action, whether at common law or 
statutorily dictated, take on especial significance, serving to ‘filter’43 out, and hence prevent, vexatious or 
frivolous actions.44  
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It should be noted that, in concluding that corporate actions should not be entertained under section 216, 
the Court of Appeal is not denying the court's jurisdiction to order direct relief to the subject company.45 
The width of statutory language employed in the oppression action is universally acknowledged. Section 
216(2) is typical in providing for a non-exhaustive list of potential orders that the court may make which 
is expressly stated to be ‘without prejudice’ to the court's jurisdiction to ‘make such order as it thinks fit’. 
The only limitation to this jurisdiction, as noted by the Court of Appeal in the earlier decision of Kumagai 
Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon Pte Ltd,46 is that the order must be made ‘with a view to bringing to an end or 
remedying the matters complained of’. What the court's conclusion does mean, however, is that the 
court's jurisdiction to order corporate relief should only be exercised if the complaint was, in the first 
place, a personal one of oppression or unfair prejudice. Only such complaints fall properly within the 
ambit of section 216. As Lord Scott pointed out in Re Chime Corpn Ltd,47 ‘[t]he fact … that the terms of a 
statute create or confer a jurisdiction in very wide terms does not necessarily mean that the courts have an 
unlimited jurisdiction to make any orders that are within the wide statutory terms’.48 It is, however, 
possible to envisage situations where an order for corporate relief may be appropriate, or even necessary, 
in order to provide the applicant with the remedy that will ‘bring to an end or remedy the matters 
complained of’. For example, the shareholder may, for personal reasons, prefer to buy out the oppressor.49 
In such a case, the court may make a concurrent order that the errant respondent should compensate the 
company for such losses as he or she had caused the company to suffer. Similarly, in situations where the 
court considers that the company ought properly to be wound up,50 it may be appropriate that restitution 
in respect of the wrongs be first made to the company.51  
The remaining question is: where should the line that divides the personal from the derivative be drawn?52 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that there will always be ‘grey areas’53 and that, as much will depend 
on the particular factual matrix pertaining to each case, hard and fast rules are of little utility.54 The court 
referred to two judgments, one from the UK and the other from Canada, for assistance. In the English 
decision of Re Charnley Davies Ltd (No 2),55 Millett J had opined that the distinction lay, not in the 
particular acts or omissions of which complaint is made, but in the nature of the complaint and the 
remedy necessary to meet it. If the true complaint had been the unlawfulness of the impugned conduct, 
which could be adequately addressed by an order for restitution to the company or some other substantive 
corporate remedy, the complaint should be classified as derivative. On the other hand, if the complaint 
was mismanagement of the company's affairs in disregard of the applicant's interests, and the 
unlawfulness was raised as evidence of this,56 the complaint should be classified as personal. In the 
Canadian case of Pappan v Acan Windows Inc,57 the court utilised the concept of ‘incidental injury’58 to 
draw the distinction. If the shareholder's injury was not distinct from the company's injury but was 
necessarily incidental thereto, the action was derivative. Drawing from these observations, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that: 
‘in order to succeed in a minority oppression action, the minority shareholder has to show something 
more than the unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct and further that the shareholder's injury does not 
merely reflect that suffered by the company’.59  
Given that the complaints in the present case were all allegations of wrongs to the company,60 the court 
considered that the essence of Sim City's complaint was derivative in nature and that it was in reality 
seeking restitution of the sums wrongfully appropriated by Ng. In the circumstances, the action ought to 
have proceeded by way of a section 216A application. 
D. Conclusion 
The Court of Appeal's decision in Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd contributes to our 
understanding of the boundaries of the oppression remedy in section 216. It is also in part cautionary, as it 
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tells us that, whilst intended to be more wide than narrow in its scope of application, section 216 is 
nevertheless not the panacea for all the corporate ills that a minority shareholder might encounter. Whilst 
the oppression remedy does, to some extent, allow the courts to look beyond the formal structure of the 
company,61 this cannot be taken so far as to ignore the corporate–personal divide entirely. The boundaries 
of section 216 remain, it would appear, ultimately defined by the Saloman principle. 
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